D.C. sues Zuckerberg over Cambridge Analytica breach
Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg is targeted in a lawsuit filed by D.C. Attorney General Karl Racine (D) Monday over allegations that he directly participated in decision-making that led to the Cambridge Analytica data breach.
The lawsuit comes amid Racine’s ongoing case against Facebook, now under the parent company name Meta, filed in 2018 over the breach.
The new lawsuit characterizes Zuckerberg as more than “a figurehead at Facebook” who “is personally involved in nearly every major decision the company makes.” The suit alleges that in that role Zuckerberg was directly involved in decisions that led to third-party Cambridge Analytica to get personal data of users in the lead up to the 2016 election.
Racine attempted to add Zuckerberg to the initial suit filed against the company, but in March a judge rejected the request, arguing Racine had waited too long.
Racine’s office said the decision to file the new lawsuit against Zuckerberg is based on a review of hundreds of thousands of documents produced during the ongoing case against Facebook, as well as depositions with Facebook’s directors, former employees and whistleblowers, according to the attorney general’s announcement.
“The evidence shows Mr. Zuckerberg was personally involved in Facebook’s failure to protect the privacy and data of its users leading directly to the Cambridge Analytica incident,” Racine said in a statement.
“This unprecedented security breach exposed tens of millions of Americans’ personal information, and Mr. Zuckerberg’s policies enabled a multi-year effort to mislead users about the extent of Facebook’s wrongful conduct,” he added.
A Meta spokesperson declined to comment on the lawsuit.
Facebook has been facing scrutiny over the Cambridge Analytica breach for years. The company was ordered to pay $5 billion in fines by the Federal Trade Commission over privacy violations based on the breach.
Source: TEST FEED1
New Zealand to help train Ukrainian soldiers in UK
New Zealand on Monday announced it would roll out a training program for Ukrainian soldiers to teach how to operate artillery weapons as the country continues to defend against Russian forces.
New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern said in a release that 30 members of an artillery team with the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) would begin training Ukrainian soldiers in the United Kingdom on the operation of L119 105 mm tactical howitzer light guns.
Training with the artillery weapons had been requested. The program will begin next month and last until the end of July.
Ardern said New Zealand fully supported Ukraine’s fight for independence after Russia invaded the country in late February.
“We have been clear throughout Russia’s assault on Ukraine, that such a blatant attack on innocent lives and the sovereignty of another country is wrong, and our response has not only included the condemnation of Russia, but practical support for Ukraine,” the prime minister said in a statement.
New Zealand will additionally arm Ukraine with supplies of ammunition and gun sights while assisting the country with humanitarian relief.
The South Pacific nation has already provided $15.7 million to Ukraine for military equipment and has rolled out sanctions against Russian entities and persons.
The news comes just days after U.S. President Biden signed a $40 billion aid package for Ukraine that includes military and humanitarian assistance for the European nation as it fights for its independence.
Support from other nations, particularly NATO, has bolstered the Ukrainian resistance. Ukraine has pushed Russian forces back from the capitol region around Kyiv and continues to put up a stiff resistance in the eastern Donbas, where Russia regrouped for a renewed offensive.
Over the weekend, Russia declared victory in the port city of Mariupol after the last of the Ukrainian fighters hiding out in a steel plant were taken prisoner.
Source: TEST FEED1
How the FCC can protect consumers from unwanted political text message spam
Have you been getting bombarded with unwanted political text messages on your personal cell phone? Have you noticed that opting out of these annoying messages leads to an endless game of whack-a-mole, such that replying “STOP” or “UNSUBSCRIBE” only causes you to receive similar messages from different phone numbers? It’s frustrating and unnerving and these messages are clogging a once spam-free gateway. It’s time for the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) new leadership to step in and put an end to the billions of unwanted political text message spam.
Advances in technology, data mining and list vending have made unwanted political text messaging inexpensive to deploy, virtually impossible to opt-out of and easy to abuse. Once an exclusive opt-in-only service that provided voters with the information they desired has become a ubiquitous form of spam marketing at all levels of political engagement.
It does not need to be that way. In 2008, I sent the first political text messages for Barack Obama’s presidential campaign. It was an honor and a privilege — one that imbues me with the responsibility to make sure that this technology improves our political discourse, rather than degrades it.
Consequently, I have spent years updating the FCC about advances in spam technology and urging action against new and nefarious mobile political tactics.
Ten years ago, almost to the day, I wrote Obama’s FCC Chair, Julius Genachowski, with a similar request to have the FCC put an end to email and text-message political spam and close any loopholes that were allowing a new type of dirty-tricks campaigning to thrive — spreading fake news and nasty rumors through mobile messages.
Using text messages for election-related outreach (e.g. getting out the vote, providing early vote reminders and supporting fundraising and crowd-building efforts) has been a huge benefit to political campaigns. Voters can subscribe to these messages by opting in to a registered five or six-digit shortcode (Barack Obama’s number was 6-2-2-6-2, which spells O-B-A-M-A on a telephone keypad). These “phone numbers” can easily be blocked by the end-user, the cellphone carrier or the self-governing industry association (CTIA). While the shortcode system experienced growing pains during its infancy, it was governed by strict opt-in guidelines and published a playbook of consistently applied rules that assured that no marketer was allowed to spam consumers.
America was one of the only countries in the world that did not suffer from massive text-message spam. Strict consumer laws such as the CAN-SPAM Act and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), among others, limited such electronic intrusions into our personal lives. In 2015, FCC chair Tom Wheeler tried to strengthen these protections by finally ruling on the petition that my firm had filed with Genachowski’s FCC back in 2012. The committee ruled that “consumers are entitled to the same consent-based protections for texts as they are for voice calls to wireless numbers.”
So, what happened?
As cell phone usage skyrocketed, text messaging proliferated, and voters cut the cord to their landlines; political marketers became more willing to risk targeting cell phone numbers with unwanted text messages.
During these same years, older marketing tactics like door-knocking and direct mail were becoming harder to deploy and less effective in reaching many nontraditional voters. Transient voters aren’t easily found on traditional voter files and don’t easily match with internet cookie files. So, data firms started selling these targeted voters’ cell phone numbers, which they acquired through credit card companies, banks and other sources.
By 2016, a half dozen tech firms (both Democratic and Republican) were selling peer-to-peer (P2P) text message services. Sen. Bernie Sanders’s (I-Vt.) and former Sec. of State Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaigns were using Hustle. MoveOn had partnered with Spoke and Republican tech firms like RumbleUp were offering the same technology. Millions of dollars in investment moved into spam-tech efforts — all to skirt the FCC and TCPA opt-in rules and spam voters.
Tactics evolved from email to text-message spam to 10-digit long-codes (10DLC) that look like normal phone numbers. These codes, unlike shortcodes, cost hundreds of dollars less per code, have a simple registration process and can be set up in a few days instead of six to eight weeks.
Unfortunately, in June of 2020 the peer-to-peer texting firms gained traction with a new FCC. And by October of 2020 (buried in the FCC’s election season warnings ironically about spam) the FCC, chaired by Ajit Pai, gave permission to the P2P text messaging industry to send unrequested messages for political purposes as long as the messages are delivered without using an “auto-dialer.”
In other words, the FCC actually made it easier for political spammers who lobbied them to practice business as usual and undermined years of efforts to close these loopholes. Suddenly, groups could load a bunch of targeted cell phone numbers onto their organizers’ phones through a mobile app to text spam voters so that it would be considered peer-to-peer messages and not auto-dialing spam.
To protect American voters, the FCC must review its policies and close the loopholes that are causing rampant and impossible-to-stop political text spam from occurring. The FCC needs to acknowledge:
- Texting an entire voter file of unsuspecting voters is not peer-to-peer communication. These spam messages are not intended to be two-way conversations among peers to help increase political discourse. They are not originated from humans texting their “friends.” Instead, they are simply uploaded lists, crowd-sourced through a mobile app.
- It is impossible to opt out of these messages. Political campaigns are not required to keep a permanent do-not-text list and can upload these numbers into a new 10DLC in a matter of seconds. Without strict regulation, campaigns will generate new numbers from which to send text spam quicker than a hydra sprouts new heads.
- Nefarious spammers can send messages through unregistered 10DLC that contain false and misleading information by simply paying a slightly higher fee for using an unregistered code. Instead of hitting a roadblock, they are being given an EZ-Pass.
- There is no punishment that prevents voter-file managers, data providers and other campaign aides from selling cell phone numbers that have opted out of political communications. These brokers are not required to create a permanent do-not-text list. (The FCC could require this at the broker level or even a carrier-based blacklist)
- Today’s massive volume of unregulated political mobile spam is turning into a tactic of voter suppression. These unlimited messages are now being used as persuasion messaging, often sending out misleading information and thwarting civic turnout efforts by adding chaos and stress to an already divided electorate.
It’s a new day for the FCC. The official biography of the current chair, Jessica Rosenworcel, says that she believes that communications can foster security and enrich our civic life. Clearly, the overblown amount of unrequested, unauthorized, political text spam desperately needs some additional regulation. I hope for the sake of all our civic lives and basic mental health that the FCC reviews and tightens its policies to finally put an end to unwanted political text spam.
Scott Goodstein was the external online director for Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign in charge of the campaign’s social media platforms, mobile technology and lifestyle marketing. He was a lead digital strategist on Bernie Sanders’s 2016 campaign and is the founder of CatalystCampaigns.com.
Source: TEST FEED1
Cheney warns of 'threat we have never faced' in jab at Trump during award speech
Rep. Liz Cheney (R-Wyo.) on Sunday condemned the Jan. 6, 2021, riot at the Capitol and President Trump’s alleged attempts to overturn the results of the 2020 election when she accepted the prestigious John F. Kennedy Profile in Courage Awards, warning the crowd of “a threat we have never faced before — a former president attempting to unravel our constitutional republic.”
In a speech as a recipient of the JFK award, Cheney highlighted the contrasts between past presidents who honored the “sacred obligation” of the transfer of power after an election loss to what happened on Jan. 6, when a pro-Trump mob stormed the Capitol in a bid to overturn certification of the 2020 election.
“This sacred obligation to defend the peaceful transfer of power has been honored by every American president except one,” Cheney said. “The question for every one of us is in this time of testing, will we do our duty, will we defend our constitution, will we stand for truth, will we put duty to our oath above partisan politics?
“Or will we look away from danger, ignore the threat, embrace the lies and enable the liar?” Cheney continued. “As we face a threat we have never faced before — a former president attempting to unravel our constitutional republic — at this moment we must all summon the courage to stand against that.”
The JFK Profile in Courage Award is awarded to a handful of recipients each year around the time of the late president’s birthday on May 29. It is usually presented by Kennedy’s daughter Caroline Kennedy to public servants who make courageous decisions regardless of personal or professional consequences.
Other recipients of the JFK Profile in Courage Awards this year included Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky; Michigan Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson; Arizona House Speaker Rusty Bowers; and former Fulton County, Georgia Election Department employee Wandrea’ ArShaye Moss.
Cheney serves as the vice chair of the House Select Committee investigating the Jan. 6 rioting. She was a former Trump ally and served as chair of the House Republican Conference before criticizing the de facto Republican leader after the rioting, earning the former president’s ire and becoming the banner lawmaker for what Trump calls a “Republican in name only.”
At the award ceremony, Cheney painted a vivid picture of the Jan. 6 riot: “gas masks strewn around” in the halls of Congress, “brass markers on the floor that mark where the desk of Abraham Lincoln sat,” and “officers in black tactical gear sitting on the floor, leaning up against the statues, exhausted from the brutal hand to hand combat they had been engaged in for hours.”
“These men and women had spent hours battling a violent mob — a mob of our fellow countrymen attempting to stop the transition of presidential power,” Cheney said. “It is no exaggeration to say that their courage likely saved our lives and our democracy.”
The Jan. 6 riot is connected to at least five deaths, including civilians and police officers who battled it out on the grounds of the U.S. Capitol. The Department of Justice has vigorously prosecuted the rioters connected to the event, with more than 830 people charged and around 300 having pleaded guilty to various charges.
In her Sunday speech, Cheney repeated that the honorable transfer of power was the cornerstone of democracy. She said after the U.S. won its independence from England after the revolutionary war, George Washington handed over the power of the continental army over to Congress.
“With this noble act, George Washington set the indispensable example of the peaceful transfer of power in our country,” Cheney said. “In our Republic, some things have to matter.”
Source: TEST FEED1
Yes to Finland and Sweden in NATO
With Helsinki and Stockholm now formally requesting membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the world will reach an important juncture. The overwhelming Western anger at Vladimir Putin’s Russia makes ratification by NATO’s 30 legislative branches a strong likelihood in the weeks or months to come. Turkey is objecting now, but some degree of debate, as well as give and take, within the alliance is normal in such matters.
Putin’s heinous and unwarranted attack on the nation, government and people of Ukraine has unified virtually all of Europe and North America against him. In just a matter of months, Finnish support for NATO membership skyrocketed from about a quarter to three-quarters of the population. Apart from Turkey, NATO nations seem favorably inclined to the proposal — as we think they should be.
The central argument for bringing these Nordic nations into the alliance is that Putin has proven himself to be far more reckless than once believed. Until this year, his previous acts of aggression — at home and abroad — were carefully calibrated to avoid quagmires, limit the use of force, preserve deniability, and ensure that Putin himself would remain widely consulted by the West on most major matters of regional and global security. No longer. And for Russia now facing the likelihood of 10 percent or more decline in GDP this year and a far slower future growth trajectory than otherwise would have been likely, and suffering perhaps 20,000 war dead already — in contrast to the 15,000 it lost in the entirety of the Afghanistan conflict from 1979 through 1989 — the pain is enormous.
A leader who could so miscalculate is dangerous — he has revealed himself to be a major risk-taker with the potential for huge errors of judgment. Moreover, Putin is in trouble and therefore may be tempted to take action designed to change the strategic context. It no longer seems incredulous that he would move Russian forces into eastern Estonia or Latvia to “protect” native Russian speakers (who now have witnessed the true nature of Putin’s protective instincts); attack road networks in eastern Poland to slow NATO’s efforts to provide military supplies to Ukraine; or probe around other parts of NATO’s and the European Union’s eastern flanks, perhaps to shock the West into negotiating with him out of fear of further escalation.
It is hard to blame the Finns and Swedes, already often subject to Russian military provocations by aircraft or ships, for feeling anxious. Finnish and Swedish defense doctrine has long assumed that wartime movement would lead to new alliances, whether based on ties to Washington, NATO partnership, or the EU’s mutual defense clause. That is precisely what has happened as a result of the close-to-home war in Ukraine.
Finland’s and Sweden’s membership would remove unnecessary and dangerous ambiguity from the strategic map of northern Europe, not least by providing further alignment between EU and NATO membership. Putin sees the EU as an enemy, so it makes little sense for EU members to remain outside NATO. We also should not forget that it was the EU-Ukraine relationship that served as Putin’s excuse for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014.
There was always a counterargument to offering NATO membership to Ukraine: the linguistic, historical, cultural, religious and ethnic closeness of Ukraine and Russia made the idea of bringing Ukraine, but not Russia, into NATO a sensitive proposition — perhaps not unlike what it would mean for the United States if Canada chose to enter a rivalrous and historically adversarial security alliance. The point is not to excuse Russian atrocities, then or now; the invasion of Ukraine is Putin’s war and he bears the moral responsibility. However, there is a sharp distinction between Ukraine, on the one hand, and Sweden as well as Finland on the other.
Despite some periods of Russian dominance of the latter, the Nordic nations are entirely distinct from Russia, with long histories and strong identities, intertwined with each other rather than Moscow. They always have been Western in orientation; now, they wish to be Western, in wholesale, in their security commitments as well. This is a logical, legitimate decision that we should applaud and support.
Finally, in military terms, the Nordic countries are defensible. Finland, in particular, despite its proximity to Russia, has excellent strategic depth geographically, as well as a hardy and militarily competent people with hundreds of thousands of reservists ready to be activated in defense of their nation on short notice. Yet it lacks the offensive forces that could cause any serious risk to Russia; it has about 100 tanks in its active forces, another 100 in reserve, and some 100 combat aircraft (including some brand-new F-35s, but hardly a major offensive strike force). Together these do not constitute a significant maneuver force; few countries have designed a more purely defensive capability than Finland. Sweden’s armed forces are similar in their chief characteristics, with a greater focus on naval capabilities.
Because of the capabilities of these nations, and the demonstrated weakness of Russia’s military, they will not need much help in defending their territories, especially in terms of ground combat capability. If there is a push for renewed U.S. attention, it should be toward the security of the many Swedish and Finnish isles in the Baltic Sea that can serve as the Western alliance’s natural “aircraft carriers” at a time of conflict. The bottom line is, NATO will not need to base large numbers of troops from the United States or other members in Sweden or Finland.
Indeed, it is the Baltic states already in NATO, since 2004, that are on much shakier military ground, with small territories, modest armed forces, and considerable geographic exposure. We will, as an alliance, need to make a transition from the trip-wire presence that NATO’s major countries have maintained in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania since 2014 to the rudiments of a combat-capable, forward defense capability with the potential for rapid reinforcement in a crisis. Having Finland and Sweden in NATO can help in that process, given their proximity to the region and the Baltic Sea. This way, and because the two are technically fully compatible with NATO, Finland’s and Sweden’s membership would strengthen the security of other Nordic and Baltic member states.
Thus, on strategic as well as military grounds, the case for NATO membership for Finland and Sweden is strong. The time to act on their membership is as soon as possible, not once an uneasy truce prevails in Ukraine and NATO capitals may be less willing to disturb Europe’s fragile peace — or once Putin gets more desperate and looks seriously for additional ways to lash out.
Michael O’Hanlon is the Philip H. Knight Chair in Defense and Strategy at the Brookings Institution, and author of several books, including “The Art of War in an Age of Peace: U.S. Grand Strategy and Resolute Restraint” and “Defense 101: Understanding the Military of Today and Tomorrow.” Follow him on Twitter @MichaelEOHanlon.
Lauri Tähtinen is a nonresident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a nonresident fellow at the Center on U.S. Politics and Power of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. He is the founder of Americas Outlook LLC, and co-founder of GEOSTREAMS. Follow him on Twitter @lauritahtinen.
Source: TEST FEED1
Trust in democracies rising in wake of Ukraine invasion: poll
Trust in democracies has risen in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, according to a new poll.
The Edelman Trust Barometer released Monday found the biggest gains among respondents in the U.S., the United Kingdom and Germany.
Forty-nine percent of U.S. respondents said they trusted democracies, an uptick from 43 percent in January.
Fifty percent of British respondents, meanwhile, said they had faith in democracies, up from 44 percent five months ago.
And Germany saw the same 6-percentage point increase during the same period, with 50 percent of respondents now saying they have trust in democracies.
Fifty percent of French respondents also said that they trust democracies, a 2 percent increase from January.
Pollsters also discovered that 59 percent of respondents in the survey said that want global businesses to add geopolitical issues to their agenda.
Eighty-five percent of respondents said that businesses should focus on economic issues and 77 percent of those surveyed said businesses should focus on societal issues.
The 2022 Edelman Trust Barometer poll was conducted in April and May with a total of 14,000 respondents from 14 countries. Its sampling error margin was 0.8 points.
Source: TEST FEED1
What we got wrong about nuclear risk reduction
Existing risk reduction tools are designed to prevent risks associated with misperception or inadvertent escalation. They are not tailored to the type of intentional escalation and risk-taking that Russian President Vladimir Putin has demonstrated with regards to Ukraine. Preventing further escalation and nuclear use will require strengthening deterrence and developing new risk reduction tools.
In recent years, states and civil society groups have encouraged a number of initiatives to reduce the risks of escalation and use of nuclear weapons. While these efforts are an important contribution to nuclear stability, events in Ukraine demonstrate that they have largely been focused on the wrong type of nuclear risk. Putin has intentionally escalated the crisis in Ukraine — and is a bully. Reducing the risk of nuclear use in Ukraine, therefore, will require a new approach. The forthcoming public release of the U.S Nuclear Posture Review is an important opportunity for U.S. government stakeholders to advance a new risk reduction agenda.
Nuclear risks during crises can take various forms. First are risks of inadvertent escalation, such as misperceptions about intent or miscommunication. This includes an entanglement scenario, such as that outlined by James Acton of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, whereby an attack on conventional command and control also disables nuclear command and control. The second set of risks are caused by accidental escalation, such as mistargeting. Both of these remain potential scenarios in Ukraine, depending on how NATO responds. Thus far, international risk reduction efforts have been largely focused on such inadvertent or accidental escalation.
But the invasion of Ukraine is escalation of a different sort — it is intentional escalation. Russia’s strategic doctrine is made up of offensive and defensive components, to include intimidation and imposing costs in an effort to manage escalation. While often misrepresented as “escalate to de-escalate,” Russia’s holistic approach to strategic deterrence ultimately is about intentional risk manipulation. Prior to the invasion it was largely assumed this risk manipulation and aggression would cross domains and include large-scale cyberattacks and complex “wormhole escalation.” The conflict has remained conventional in nature so far, but the potential for escalation to include cyberattacks or the use of a weapon of mass destruction remains.
Existing risk reduction tools include crisis communication channels and hotlines, along with the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. In recent years, there has been a focus by the international community to develop new risk reduction tools. One such effort is the Stockholm Initiative, which involves 16 nations and in June 2021 issued a paper on risk reduction efforts. One of the group’s recommendations was to advance, “policies and doctrines that could reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security policies, prevent escalation leading to the use of nuclear weapons and lessen the danger of nuclear war, including transparency on nuclear doctrines and arsenals, political statements promoting restraint, providing robust negative security assurances including of a legally-binding nature, commitment not to develop/deploy certain categories of nuclear weapons or delivery systems, and reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons.” These and other efforts are largely intended to develop rules of the road to regulate crises and risks, along with reducing reliance on nuclear weapons overall.
One of the biggest drawbacks to existing risk reduction measures is that they are based on transparency and a normative approach. Putin has proven willing to defy norms. And any conversations to promote “transparency” or shared commitments to risk reduction should be met with a degree of skepticism. For example, only one month before the invasion of Ukraine, Russia along with China, France, the United Kingdom and United States jointly stated that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” The invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s nuclear threats throw the sincerity and value of these efforts into question.
Thus far, risk reduction efforts failed to prevent the crisis in Ukraine, but now they must shift to managing the crisis and preventing further escalation. This will require balancing a commitment to deterrence with leadership on risk reduction. Deterrence is a means of crisis management and convincing Putin that further escalation — including any use of a weapon of mass destruction or attack on a NATO ally — will be met with a swift and painful response should be a priority. NATO’s nuclear status is one of the best means of preventing an attack on a member and reassures understandably anxious nations in the region. A strong U.S. nuclear deterrent is the foundation of the alliance and should be reinforced in the implementation of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review and in forthcoming NATO strategic documents.
The United States should also engage with international risk reduction efforts, such as the Stockholm Initiative. The invasion of Ukraine is a reckoning about the practicality and utility of existing risk reduction forums and recommendations. Rather than abandon these efforts altogether, however, Washington can play a leadership role in shaping them to reflect the geopolitical landscape and developing a richer risk reduction toolkit. Ideally, other NATO allies would also prioritize such efforts. Risk reduction, arms control and security cooperation are not mutually exclusive from a strong deterrent. An integrated arms control strategy, to reflect integrated deterrence, can offer a new approach to risk reduction and identify a broader, more agile set of tools.
Heather Williams, Ph.D., is the director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She was previously a visiting fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard Kennedy School and a senior lecturer in defence studies at King’s College London. Follow her on Twitter: @heatherwilly
Source: TEST FEED1
School choice can take political fights out of education
If you live in a state that held primaries last week, you’re probably sick of political ads. In my home state of Pennsylvania, millions were spent on the governor’s race alone—and millions more will be spent leading up to the general election in November.
Much of the contention in these races revolved around education issues. From teaching sex education in young grades to lessons about racial issues to COVID-19 policies, education is a hot topic. Since opinions about these issues often fall along party lines, the general election is likely to be even more contentious.
What if there’s a better way? What if we could take most of the political fights out of education?
We can. The current winner-takes-all system forces parents to engage in political battles to get their children the education they think is best. But when one group of parents “wins,” that means another group loses.
School choice—letting education dollars follow children to the option that works best for them—is the answer. When parents can choose where and how their children will be educated, they’re no longer at the mercy of politicians and bureaucrats. That means they don’t have to rely on political battles when it comes to education.
Plus, school choice is very popular among parents and voters in general. Consider education savings accounts (ESAs). ESAs are the most flexible form of school choice, allowing parents to direct a portion of their children’s education funding for things like tutoring, tuition, curriculum, and services for children with special needs. Parental support for ESAs has been 84 to 86 percent in the last few years.
But parental choice in education isn’t just good politics; it’s good policy. Looking at nearly 170 empirical studies on the impacts of school choice shows very strong positive impacts—on test scores, educational attainment, parental satisfaction, civic practices, and fiscal effects. Very few of the studies (6.5 percent) showed negative impacts.
So why don’t most states have widespread school choice if there’s robust support for it and it works well?
Teachers unions are the biggest roadblock to widespread school choice. In addition to backing candidates who oppose school choice, they actively campaign to stop school choice legislation in states.
Beyond that, most people grew up attending their assigned district school, so it’s easy to just think that’s the way education works. But the origins of assigning children to schools based on where they live isn’t some magic formula designed to ensure the best education possible. The reason for residential assignment is quite simple—the system was designed in the 1800s, when travel and communication were very difficult.
We haven’t faced those limitations for a long time. And after schools were closed in response to COVID-19, parents are seeing how many options there really are when it comes to education. Pandemic pods, microschools, hybrid schools, and other private schools—parents who never looked beyond their local district school are suddenly seeing education in a new light. And many want to stick with these new options.
School choice policies can ensure parents across the income spectrum have access to these new options. By letting education funding follow students—rather than being locked in any one system—families will be able to choose the education that works for them.
Education has major lifelong impacts on children. Given state mandates and taxpayer funding of education in the U.S., the ability to decide what that education looks like shouldn’t be reserved to the wealthy. It’s worth noting that the U.S. is an outlier in its reliance on assigned schooling. In most democratic countries, parents can use public funding for a variety of schooling options—including religious schools.
Last year was widely dubbed the “year of educational choice,” with new or expanded education choice policies passed in 18 states. So far, this year has been quieter—while dozens of school choice bills have been introduced, only a few have been enacted.
But parents aren’t going away. They know they need different options to meet their children’s needs, and they’re learning how to advocate for those options. By enacting more policies that let education funding follow students, lawmakers can help families get the education they need while reducing political fights.
Colleen Hroncich is a policy analyst with the Cato Institute’s Center for Educational Freedom.
Source: TEST FEED1
When should a secretary of defense or senior general quit?
Article II, Section 2, The U.S. Constitution: The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States…”
One of the foundations of the American political system is civilian control of the military extending from the president to the Department of Defense. The civilian secretary of defense and service secretaries are in charge. And the law directs that the chairman of the joint chiefs and the five military chiefs are principal advisers to their civilian bosses and are not in the chain of command.
Since 1789, this has worked. With the onset of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, the commander in chief role of the president became more complicated. Suppose an enemy launched a nuclear strike against the United States. With only minutes to react, if the president gave the order to unleash America’s nuclear weapons, that would be a de facto declaration of war. But only Congress has that authority.
While this scenario was often discussed, only once did a secretary of defense act to ensure that any presidential orders to use force were specifically routed through him as next in the chain of command. During the October 1973 war, James Schlesinger was very concerned that President Nixon, under great duress over Watergate and the threat of Soviet intervention against Israel, would issue a bad or illegal order. Fortunately, that contingency did not occur.
Former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper’s new book, “Sacred Trust,” perhaps inadvertently, raises the question of what happens when or if the commander in chief issues an order that his subordinates feel compelled not to follow or to circumvent. If the order is illegal or deemed to be so, then it need not be carried out. In the book, Esper cites several instances of how he dealt with this.
Told to remove a large number of troops from Germany, Esper found a way to redeploy the forces in Europe so as to keep the total level unchanged. In another case, President Trump wanted to attack drug cartels in Mexico and deny responsibility — portrayed years before in the movie “Clear and Present Danger.” Last, Trump wanted to use active duty troops to cope with the violence that broke out after the killing of George Floyd in May 2020 in violation of posse comitatus forbidding the military from carrying out any law enforcement duties without invoking the Insurrection Act.
Esper also wrote that he chose not to resign so that he could restrain the impulses and instincts of the commander in chief and because he feared a “yes man” would take his place. Given the disruptive and undisciplined nature of Donald Trump, some of what Esper described was plausible. But people who know Trump countered that often he would present what seemed a bizarre idea to get a reaction or to make a point knowing full well he would not demand that this directive be implemented. Still, that a secretary of defense worried about what his boss might or might order is chilling.
The debate over when or whether to resign or quit in protest is as old as the republic. Esper’s predecessor as secretary of defense, retired Marine General Jim Mattis, resigned over removing troops from Syria without being consulted. However, Mattis had other reasons as well. To his credit, the general has kept his counsel since leaving office.
American military culture has been not to resign. No chairman of the joint chiefs has. Over many decades, only one service chief stood down in protest. The judgment was, barring an illegal or immoral order, staying the course as the better choice.
No guidelines exist about when or whether to resign. Barring very unlikely scenarios, it is the sworn duty of the military to respect the orders of seniors. That said, in taking the oath of office, all military personnel swear or affirm to “support and defend the Constitution” not an individual, even the president.
Whether or not Esper made the correct decision in staying as secretary, it did not work. He had little influence on the president. And he was fired. If he had resigned, it would have had no impact on Trump.
To the degree guidance is needed, before assuming high office, each nominee must think through what circumstances might warrant resignation. Then, to honor the oath to the Constitution, each must be prepared to quit if the situation so demands. There is no other option.
Harlan Ullman, Ph.D, is senior adviser at Washington, D.C.’s Atlantic Council and the primary author of “shock and awe.” His latest book is, “The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD: How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and that World at Large.” Follow him on Twitter @harlankullman.
Source: TEST FEED1