Congress is considering legislation that would provide a boost to the U.S. semiconductor industry to be more competitive with China. Notwithstanding the slimming of the broader China competition bill, this legislation is timely because it aligns with an awakening that is also occurring in NATO regarding the growing strategic threat from China.
Last month, for the first time in its history, NATO officially identified China as a strategic priority, marking a major policy change for the Alliance and an increasing strategic alignment between major Western powers on the issue of competition with China. This policy shift was part of the Alliance’s June release of its new Strategic Concept in Madrid, Spain.
Because of differences in geography, politics and economic entanglements, the 30 NATO nations have distinct perspectives on the extent of China’s threat. However, the strengthening Russia-China relationship has given NATO nations a fresh perspective on the shifting geopolitical dynamics.
The announcement of China’s “no limits” friendship with Russia, joint exercises between the Chinese and Russian navies, China’s alignment with Russia on messaging about the war in Ukraine — including blaming NATO for the aggression — as well as the joint statement China released with Russia condemning NATO’s enlargement have reframed the threat that China poses to the Alliance.
What opportunities does NATO’s strategic awakening provide to harmonize competing views on the European continent regarding China? How can the Alliance present a more unified and global approach to facing competition with China?
NATO can and should play a unique role in the global, strategic competition with China. But to do so, it needs to achieve a common view, initiate a strategic decoupling of critical supply chains and limit infrastructure investments, and strengthen its Indo-Pacific partnerships.
Release a NATO strategy on China: NATO’s new Strategic Concept uses strong language to name the threats China poses to Euro-Atlantic security. The document clearly pits Beijing’s policies and ambitions against the Alliance’s interests, security and values. It refers to China’s policies and tactics as “coercive,” its hybrid and cyber operations as “malicious,” and its rhetoric as “confrontational,” even going so far as to say that China is joining Russia in its efforts to “subvert the rules-based international order, including in the space, cyber and maritime domains.”
NATO should release a security strategy document that further provides examples of how China’s activities impact security on the European continent and outlines a strategy to counter them. The Alliance should focus on only those activities that most clearly impact Euro-Atlantic security interests in order to maintain a politically unified front in its approach to China. While the emerging Russia-China partnership is of growing concern, China is distinct from Russia and plays a key economic role in both North America and Europe. NATO should remain open to constructive engagement with China, especially in facing global security challenges such as piracy and climate change.
Decouple critical supply chains and limit infrastructure investment: Just as European nations have scrambled to disentangle their supply chains from Russia, they also must take decisive steps to reduce dependencies and even decouple their most critical supply chains from China. From flash memory chips in the latest iPhones to semiconductors in Amazon servers, to dominance in clean energy technology, China has multifaceted abilities to impact Euro-Atlantic security through the pervasiveness of its technology. Vulnerabilities are not limited to civilian technology and can also impact military equipment. Most recently, circuit boards for the next-generation F-35 warplane came under scrutiny after it was publicized that the British manufacturer of the boards is owned by a Chinese parent company.
Disentangling supply chains could include working with the European Union on technology standards and policies, as well as taking more deliberate efforts to build out the “Allied Innovation Base” to fund homegrown technological development.
There is also concern about Chinese investments in European critical infrastructure, which has implications for NATO’s ability to mobilize and respond to crises. Two-thirds of European Union member states are signed on as formal partners in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, allowing Chinese investments in energy, railroads, roads and ports. In fact, around 10 percent of European port capacity is owned by Chinese state firms. NATO can highlight the security risks of these investments and work with both the EU and member nation governments to create greater screening for Chinese investments in critical infrastructure.
Strengthen NATO partnerships in the Indo-Pacific: NATO should formalize and enhance enduring strategic partnerships with key Indo-Pacific nations such as South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. The inclusion of the heads of states from these countries at the Madrid Summit sent a strong message of enhanced regional strategic cooperation. Efforts to strengthen these partnerships should include increasing political consultations, information sharing, and interoperability efforts. These partnerships allow for expanded regional security awareness and resilience, allowing NATO to play a role in balancing out China’s increasing assertiveness.
NATO’s ability to publicly, under consensus, identify the systemic challenges posed by a rising China opens up countless opportunities for NATO to integrate its security activities across its global strategic partners to keep China in check. The new Strategic Concept holds the promise of a strategic alliance between Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific nations. For the United States, the ability to operate in diplomatic spaces that have a shared understanding of the scope of political, economic and technological threats posed by China will enable a common strategic view of the challenge posed by China and can serve as the foundation for collective action.
NATO must seize this opportunity to make the Alliance not only a counterweight to Russia’s aggression but also a strategic heavyweight for competition with China.
Melissa Shambach is a defense innovation analyst at BMNT.
Alex Gallo is the executive director of the Common Mission Project, a visiting fellow with the National Security Institute at George Mason University’s Scalia School of Law, and an adjunct professor in Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program.
Source: TEST FEED1
